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OVEREXERTION AS ACCIDENTAL DEATH PERMIT.
TING RECOVERY OF DOUBLE INDEMNITY
BENEFITS UNDER AN INSURANCE POLICY
-A "SERBONIAN BOG"?
HOWARD A. LAWRENCEt
THE PRACTICING LAWYER'S DILEMMA
A PRACTICING lawyer, in his conscientious effort properly to advise
a client as to the likelihood of the latter's recovering a verdict in
his favor (for after all, that is what the client is really interested in),
quite often is faced with the situation that there are either (a) none or
too few authorities or (b) too many, concerning the particular problem
upon which a sound conclusion may reasonably be based.
The construction of an insurance contract as related to a particular
set of facts, more often than not, presents a situation where a plethora
of decisions, often contradictory and inconsistent in their application
of principles of insurance contract law to seemingly similar or analogous
factual circumstances, will be such as almost to defy logical analysis.
Consequently, despite the wealth of authority, the lawyer in his despair
will often wish that there were fewer cases on the subject with which
he is concerned.
At best the attorney can merely high light for his client the applicable
legal and factual problems and rationalize on the difficulties inherent
in the case, and assume his precarious fence-sitting posture with as much
aplomb as possible. With the purpose of (a) rerdering the benefit of
his research to the practicing lawyer in the hope that it may be of some
assistance, and (b) illustrating to the undergraduate law student the
manifold problems that often beset attorneys arising out of a seemingly
simple set of facts, this article has been written.
Facts
One Smythe and his newly married wife had recently removed to
a respectable Catskill town, where he had purchased at the town's out-
skirts a house on an acre plot, practically on the edge of an adjacent
forest. One late fall Saturday afternoon, while Smythe and his wife
in near darkness were enjoying television, something crashed through
the picture window of Smythe's new home.
There was Mrs. Smythe's fearful scream, accompanied by a near-by
heavy thud on the floor of the room, the excited barking of several dogs
and virtual darkness since the television set had become disconnected.
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Smythe felt his wife slump against him; he jumped up, supporting her,
and turned on the table lamp switch. This is what he saw. A huge
deer, bloody, stretched out lifeless on the floor; by the broken picture
window were two of his neighbor's hunting dogs baying furiously for
all they were worth. Just as Smythe's wife came out of her faint, a
neighbor, dressed in a deer hunting costume and carrying a rifle, came
running up, breathless, and stood aghast, outside the window.
After some of the excitement had died down, Smythe and his neighbor
half-dragged, half-carried the buck, a splendid specimen weighing ap-
proximately 225 pounds, out of the house, across the newly fallen snow,
up a slight incline, to the neighbor's home, about 400 feet away. Then,
by the dint of much effort, they managed to carry the deer upstairs
into the attic. Smythe went back to his home and had a cocktail
before dinner in an attempt to get over the tired feeling that he had
after all the excitement and exercise. The Smythes kept their engagement
that evening to play canasta at another neighbor's house. However
since Smythe still seemed upset and tired, he went home early, a little
before midnight.
Soon after reaching home, Smythe complained of chest pains and
about one in the morning he died, presumably of a heart attack induced
by the excitement and overexertion. In accordance with his wishes,
Smythe's body was cremated and at that time apparently no one was
aware of the desirability or the necessity of an autopsy in case a claim
should be asserted for double indemnity.
One of the life insurance policies issued by a Massachusetts company
to Smythe provided for double indemnity benefits in case of accidental
death. The pertinent clause at bar set forth an undertaking by the
insurance company to pay such additional death benefit if death of the
assured
". .. resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury
effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, which injury is evi-
denced by a contusion or wound on the exterior of the body (except in case of acci-
dental drowning or an internal injury revealed by an autopsy), and... such death
occurred within ninety days after such injury was sustained ....
"The aforesaid accidental death benefit shall not be payable.., if the death of the
insured occurred directly or indirectly from or was contributed to by physical or
mental disease or infirmities or bacterial infection other than that occurring simul.
taneously and through an accidental cut or wound."
THE LEGAL PROBLEM
To the attorney for Smythe's estate a fairly exhaustive examination
of the law regarding the recovery of double indemnity benefits in case
of accidental death appear to be in order. The main purpose of such
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research was to attempt to evaluate the likelihood of success in the light
of the cases on the subject and to have available a summarization of
the applicable law and decisions in order to determine in the first instance
whether claims for double indemnity should be asserted. There are
here discussed in some detail a number of decisions on the subject of
accidental death that will serve to illustrate the perplexity and ramifi-
cations inherent in a problem of this nature. The writer believes that
the principles herein set forth represent the present status of the ap-
plicable law.
For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed (although actual
proof undoubtedly will be difficult) that it can be medically proven that
Smythe's death was caused by physical damage to his heart which
occurred as a result of the excitement engendered by the incident and
the consequent exertion of carrying the deer a considerable distance
and upstairs. Assuming that fact, is it likely that it can be established
that Smythe died as the result of an accident within the terms, conditions
and provisions of the policy previously quoted?
Discussion
The answer to that question is not easy especially since there are
a number of collateral questions involved which are referred to, infra.
In any event the primary question of double indemnity divides itself into
these two propositions:
(1) Did Smythe die as the result of "bodily injury effected solely through external,
violent and accidental means"?-the answer is probably yes.
(2) Will the policy provision requiring evidence of "a contusion or wound on the
exterior of the body" nevertheless prevent recovery?-the answer is again proba-
bly in the affirmative.
Naturally the decision of a court construing an insurance contract
will depend to a great extent upon its particular phraseology; in this
connection, two general principles of construction should be kept in
mind: (a) insurance contracts are to be construed strongly against the
insurer, but (b) they also are to be interpreted in the light of language
commonly used and understood, i.e., our common speech as used by the
ordinary businessman or the average person.
Nevertheless, despite the availability of these general rules of con-
struction, it is impossible to reconcile the many different results arrived
at by the courts on apparently the same set of facts. Moreover the
various judges continually indulge in "distinctions without a difference."
For example, many conflicting decisions arise as a result of an attempt
to draw a distinction between "accidental death and accidental means"
or between "accidental means and accidental results."
[Vol. 19
1950] RECOVERY OF DOUBLE INDEMNITY BENEFITS 289
Without essaying to delve into all the subtle refinements pertaining to
such distinctions (i.e., "accidental death and accidental means"), which
"few can understand until pointed out by lawyers and judges,"'L it ap-
pears that the primary reason for the conflict in the reports interpreting
insurance contracts is the attempt of some courts to make such refined
distinctions. To put it succinctly, if the assured voluntarily and inten-
tionally embarks upon a certain course of action, such as taking an
overdose of veronal2 to cure an earache and thereby causes his unintended
death, an insurance company will often contend that the accident policy
did not insure against accidental death but only against death caused
by an accidental means and that there were no accidental means. Or
put another way, "if a result is such as follows from ordinary means,
voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot
be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act
which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual
occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through
accidental means."3
If this purported explanation of the distinction seems like just so
much logomachy, perhaps most of the blame should be put upon the
courts, for an ordinary mortal, even with a respectable experience in
the law, is often hard put to understand the rationale of the attempted
distinctions.
Fortunately for the practicing attorney, at least in New York, such
distinctions are no longer made. Yet, illustrating the sharp conflict, we
have the Supreme Court of the United States holding that there can be
no recovery for death from sunstroke suffered while the decedent was
playing golf, under an accident policy insuring against death resulting
from "bodily injuries effected through external, violent and accidental
means," 4 whereas the Court of Appeals of New York decides the iden-
tical question to the contrary and permits a recovery.? Justice Cardozo,
vigorously dissented in the Supreme Court. He spiritedly pointed out that
the action of the majority would plunge the law of accident insurance
into a "Serbonian Bog." There is no doubt that the law of accident in-
1. Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co., 273 N. Y. 140, 144, 7 N. E. 2d 18, 20 (1937).
2. Ibid.
3. United States Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 121 (18S9). See note
72 infra.
4. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491, 495 (1934).
5. Gallagher v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 163 App. Div. 556, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1016 (2d
Dep't 1914), aff'd, 221 N. Y. 664, 117 N. E. 1067 (1917).
6. MmTox, PARADISE LosT Bk. II, line 592:
"A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog
Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old,
Where armies whole have sunk."
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surance is bogged down to such an extent that a traveler in that branch
of the law well-nigh despairs of ever being able to come up with a firm
opinion out of such treacherous footing.7
The necessity and the importance of the preceding discussion con-
cerning "accidental death" and "accidental means" should become
more apparent as numerous authorities are considered in detail, for
it is only by realizing that some judges make such distinctions that
a person can expect to keep his head above water in the maze of ir-
reconcilable conflicts in the cases.
Referring more specifically to the Smythe situation at hand, in essence
it resolves itself down to a case of overexertion. Did the physical act
of exertion, necessitated by the lifting and carrying of the deer, coupled
possibly with the emotion and excitement generated by the occasion,
cause Smythe's death? The cases on the subject of overexertion are
legion, and just as many can be found denying recovery as permit re-
covery.
Overexertion Cases
As the writer views the problem, medical testimony as to (a) the
cause of Smythe's death, (b) the relationship between the exertion of
carrying the deer and the cause of death, and (c) evidence of an external
wound (or some proof that a heart rupture or embolus is an external
wound), constitutes the crux of the matter for the successful prose-
cution of a suit to recover double indemnity benefits for Smythe's death
as accidental. Such medical proof in the writer's opinion must be forth-
coming for the case will actually turn upon that factual question. While
the decisions are often inconsistent, the writer believes that there is
sufficient authority in favor of a recovery for accidental death provided
there is present the factual medical proof necessary to sustain a plaintiff's
contention that death resulted from an accident, induced by overexertion.
(The problem of proof of an "external wound" is separately discussed,
infra.)
Applicable decisions on the joint of overexertion will now be con-
sidered in some detail. (Naturally this discussion has generally been
An excellent, recent editorial on the Serbonian Bog aspect of accident insurance Is con-
tained in 123 N. Y. L. J. 1732, Col. 2 (Correspondence May 16, 1950).
7. Another writer has also commented along these lines as follows: "This whole branch
of insurance law has become shrouded in a semantic and polemical maze, and the result
has been 'almost a wilderness of cases in which varying facts and situations have been
applied to varying principles.' The situation is fast approaching a point where the slight
flame of legal theory involved is being smothered. Some of the courts have felt It neces-
sary to resort to tortuous and tortured legal jiu-jitsu to distinguish and differentiate
between 'accidental means' and 'accident,' 'accidental result,' 'accidental death,' 'acciden-
tal injury,' etc." Note, 166 A. L. R. 477 (1934).
[Vol. 19
1950] RECOVERY OF DOUBLE INDEMNITY BENEFITS 291
restricted to the situation where there was no physical blow, fall, etc.,
as such.)
A good case with which to start this phase of the discussion, is Rock
v. Travelers' Insurance Co., involving death occasioned by the strain
of carrying a heavy casket at a funeral. There the insured was acting
as a pallbearer but collapsed while engaged in that operation and almost
immediately died of an acute dilation of the heart. The beneficiary
sought to obtain benefits under an insurance policy for death "resulting
from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other
causes, through external, violent and accidental means." Although
the California court conceded that decedent's heart had not been able
to withstand the strain put upon it by the exertion of carrying the casket
and that such strain had produced the dilation and consequent death,
it denied recovery upon the ground that the policy did "not insure against
accidental death or injuries, but against injuries effected by accidental
means." The basis for this logomachy was the fact that nothing unusual,
such as slipping or falling, had occurred in the carrying of the casket.
Despite the result reached in this California case, the writer does
not believe that it represents the best authority on the subject today. Its
attempted distinction between "accidental death" and "accidental
means", as the rationale of its decision, would probably not be followed
today, at least in New York. Assuming that the overexertion affected
the heart, such death should now be considered as coming within policy
coverage for death arising out of external, violent and accidental means.
A late New York decision will serve to demonstrate the validity of this
contention: Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'nY
The facts of that case are worthy of detailed examination. It in-
volved a policy insuring the decedent against loss of life "caused solely
and exclusively by external, violent and accidental means." In early
March the decedent was driving his automobile in central New York
State during a severe snow storm. The blizzard became so bad that it
was possible to travel only upon one-half of the roadway, with a snow
plow being unable to keep the road entirely open. It was bitter cold,
visibility was poor and there was a very high wind. The decedent met
another car going in the opposite direction which sideswiped the de-
cedent's fender, throwing his vehicle into the ditch.
Having been unable to get his car back onto the road, the decedent
left the automobile, obtained a snow shovel from a neighboring farm
house, and tried to shovel the snow away in the high wind. The decedent
apparently hit himself against the shovel and the car, and bad to be
8. 172 Cal. 462, 156 Pac. 1029 (1916).
9. 295 N. Y. 294, 67 N. E. 2d 248 (1946).
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helped back into the automobile. 10 Thereupon he sat down, breathing
heavily for a moment, and then died. The court in its opinion went
into great length in discussing the nature of accidents and the authorities
thereon. In this connection it definitely declared that "In this state
there is no longer any distinction made between accidental death and
death by accidental means, nor between accidental means and accidental
results." In the course of its opinion the court also reaffirmed its holding
that insurance policies should be written in English that the average
man can comprehend, stating:
"We pointed out that insurance policies upon which the public relies for security
in case of accident should be plainly written in understandable English 'free from
fine distinctions which few can understand until pointed out by lawyers and judges.'
A distinction between 'accidental means' and 'accidental results' is certainly not
understood by the average man and he is the one for whom the policy is written."'-
The decision of the Court of Appeals was to the effect that it was
a jury question on all the facts of the case whether, among other things,
the decedent's death was caused by overexertion. Although there seems
to exist a distinction concerning the legal effect of overexertion when
the act inducing overexertion is natural or customary with a householder
in or about his home or of a workman at his work, as contrasted with
an act of overexertion under different circumstances, the following
quotation from the Burr opinion should indicate that the effects of over-
exertion can be such as to bring that act within the accidental death
clause of the insurance policy:
"It is true that the trial court in the portion of its charge quoted (supra, p. 301)
used the word 'overexertion.' In this State we have not permitted recovery under a
policy insuring against a loss 'which is the direct and proximate result of and which
is caused solely and exclusively by external, violent and accidental means' when the
act was the natural and customary act of a householder in or about his house, or of
a workman within the scope of his duties in his calling. (Allendorf v. Fidelity Casually
Co., 250 N. Y. 529; Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 81, 85;
Wilcox v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 265 N. Y. 665; see, also, Fane v. National Assn. of
Railway Postal Clerks, 197 App. Div. 145; Niskern. v. United Brotherhood, 93 App.
Div. 364; Appel v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 86 App. Div. 83, afJ'd, 180 N. Y. 514.)
"It seems quite clear here, however, that on the facts presented, a chain of causa-
tion was set in motion beginning with the automobile accident in the course of and
brought about by travel in a very heavy snow and wind storm, followed in turn by
what may be termed an emergency resulting from the fact that the deceased had his
wife and thirteen-year-old son with him at a time when the cold was bitter and the
1O. Although apparently there was sort of a fall, the decision did not turn on such
point but was decided simply as an overexertion case.
11. Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n, 295 N. Y. 294, 302, 67 N. E.
2d 248, 252 (1946).
12. Id. at 302, 6 N. E. 2d at 252.
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automobile was being filled with sifting snow, and it was necessary for the deceased
to act to protect his family. The court referred in conclusory terms and in the dis-
junctive to possible causes of death after correctly stating the applicable law as
quoted (supra, p. 301), but neither the court nor the jury on this record could have
understood the word 'overexertion' in the sense in which it might have been used
in the Allendorf and Wilcox cases. This case is no more comparable to the conven-
tional overexertion case than if the deceased had, by an accident, been thrown into
a pit and in endeavoring to clamber out in order to save his life had died by reason
of overexertion in climbing, or had been thrown by an accident into the water and had
died from overexertion in attempting to swim ashore."' 3
This decision also stands for the proposition that usually the jury
will be given the right to make a determination as to the facts. Since
that theme runs throughout most of the opinions on the subject at hand,
no further specific reference to that self-evident principle will be made
in this memorandum. It is also noteworthy to observe that in the Burr
decision, the jury was permitted to overrule medical opinion, based
upon an autopsy, that the decedent had died of a pre-existing heart
condition.
Several years later the Appellate Division followed the Burr decision in
the case of Rankin v. New York State Employees' Retiremcnt System
1
.
4
That case involved a construction of the Civil Service law pertaining
to disability arising "as a natural and proximate result of an accident
sustained in service." On a bitter, cold winter's day, a truck driver's
gas line and fuel mechanism froze. After working on them unsuccess-
fully for three-quarters of an hour, he walked in deep snow to a building
where he arrived in an exhausted condition. After resting, he assisted
in the removal of his truck. He then proceeded home in the afternoon
and went to bed, running a temperature. A few days later it was dis-
covered that he was suffering from pleurisy and tuberculosis. Eventually
he became totally disabled.
The Appellate Division, in its decision permitting a recovery, relied
upon the Burr opinion and declared:
"... In another field a recovery under an accident insurance policy was upheld
where a decedent died of a heart attack in attempting to extricate his car from a
ditch (Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Assn., 295 N. Y. 294). While
each case must be determined on its own set of facts the authorities cited denote
considerable latitude in passing upon findings of accidental injuries. Many injuries
occasioned by heavy or unwonted exertion following an unusual event or mishap have
been classed as accidental. Doubtless the correct test to apply is to determine how
the primary event would be styled in the speech of common men. And this ordi-
narily is a matter of fact, not of law.
13. Id. at 305, 6 N. E. 2d at 253.
14. 274 App. Div. 160, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 772 (3d Dep't 1948).
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"Defendants urge, as a matter of law, that there was nothing catastrophic or
extraordinary in the chain of events which caused the reactivation of tuberculosis
in plaintiff's left lung. We think to the contrary that the genetic event was unusual
and out of the ordinary as a matter of fact. Assuming the weather conditions were
not abnormal for the time and place, as defendants suggest, we do not believe that
the freezing of a gas line and pump in a moving motor vehicle to be a usual and
common occurrence. If such were the fact the operation of any automobile after
the same had been started would be most uncertain in subzero weather. There is
nothing before us to indicate that such an occurrence is common. We are, there-
fore, of the opinion that the happening of such an event would be termed accidental
in common speech.
"Plaintiff's exposure and physical effort followed as a matter of course and as a
natural consequence of the primary mishap. All of the medical testimony agrees
that his subsequent physical disability was the direct result of that exposure and
effort." 15
Another excellent case is Simson v. Commercial Travelers Mutual
Accident Ass'n.'0 There the trial judge had set aside the verdict of the
jury in plaintiff's favor, on the ground that the injury had not been
caused by "violent, external and accidental means." The appellate
court reversed, and reinstated the jury's verdict because the trial judge
had erroneously taken the case away from the triers of the facts. The
facts contained in this report are most pertinent. Plaintiff claimed
that while attempting with considerable force to open a desk which
had become jammed, he felt a sharp and sudden internal pain. Ap-
parently plaintiff had ruptured himself in the process for shortly there-
after he underwent an operation for a strangulated hernia. In holding
it was a factual question for the jury, the court observed:
"A rupture resulting from an unusual exertion in opening a drawer may well be
held by the triers of the facts to be an accidental consequence of violent and ex-
ternal exertion. The occurrence clearly falls within the causes defining accidents
from violent, external and accidental means. (Meyer v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
249 App. Div. 243; Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 224 N. Y. 18.)"17
Similarly, in Hunter v. Federal Casualty Co.,'8 plaintiff wrenched
his back while engaged in physical exertion, felt something give way in
his back, and paralysis developed. The jury's verdict for plaintiff on
the disputed question of fact as to whether his disability had been caused
by an accidental injury or by infantile paralysis, was upheld by the
appellate court.Y0 Likewise, in Cambareri v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
15. Id at 163, 80 N. Y. S. 2d at 774.
16. 263 App. Div. 297, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 615 (1st Dep't 1942), aft'd, 289 N. Y. 700, 49
N. E. 2d 457 (1942).
17. Id. at 298, 32 N. Y. S. 2d at 616.
18. 199 App. Div. 223, 191 N. Y. Supp. 474 (4th Dep't 1921).
19. This Hunter decision is also pertinent on the problem of "visible wound"; further
discussed on that point at p. 303 infra.
(Vol. 19
1950] RECOVERY OF DOUBLE INDEMNITY BENEFITS 295
Co.,2  the Appellate Term recently held that it was a jury question as
to whether plaintiff had unusually exerted himself, while transferring
a heavy bundle of magazines, so as to come within the coverage of the
accident insurance policy.
Illustrative of the difficulties inherent in accident matters and the
conflicting views of judges in the very same state, is the history of the
recent New York case of Kleinman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.2'
Plaintiff claimed accidental death benefits under a life insurance policy
providing for double indemnity upon proof of the "death of the insured,
as a result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily
injuries sustained solely through external, violent and accidental means,
provided... that death shall not have occurred as the result... or by
the contribution, directly or indirectly, of disease or of bodily or mental
infirmity." It appeared that the insured was a traveling salesman and
while making a call, playfully put his arm around another person's
neck. That person, who was at that moment bent over, suddenly
straightened up and turned, causing the insured to fall to the floor. The
insured remained there several minutes and was pale when he finally
got to his feet. Death ensued several months later and plaintiff contended
that the assured died of a heart attack caused by the fall. There was
the usual conflict of medical opinion. Plaintiff's doctor was of the opinion
that the fall caused a rupture of a small coronary artery (coronary
thrombosis) which resulted in heart failure. Defendant's witness testi-
fied as to the heart condition revealed by an autopsy and ascribed the
death to a pre-existing sclerosis of the largest coronary artery. Under
these circumstances, the Appellate Division declared that the positive
proof furnished by the autopsy made any jury's finding based upon
opinion testimony speculative. But the Court of Appeals reversed the
Appellate Division and held that the evidence presented a question of
fact as to whether decedent's death resulted from an accident within
the meaning of the policy.
Upon a subsequent trial plaintiff again obtained a jury verdict in
her favor. Nevertheless the Appellate Division once more reversed on
the ground that it was against the weight of the credible evidence. Plain-
tiff's doctor had again testified that the death was caused by a thrombosis
resulting from the accidental fall whereas defendant's doctor contended
that the autopsy conclusively proved that the occlusion was due to a
20. 185 AIfisc. 273, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 455 (Ist Dep't 1945).
21. 298 N. Y. 759, 83 N. E. 2d 157 (1948), reversing, 273 App. Div. 252, 76 N. Y. S.
2d 618 (1st Dep't 1948); subsequent trial, 276 App. Div. 142, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 511
(1st Dep't 1949).
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coronary sclerosis. The Appellate Division gave complete weight to
defendant's testimony, stating:
"It thus appears that the absolute diagnosis after autopsy shows no factual basis
for the tentative determinations of thrombosis and, dilatation of the heart in the
clinical diagnosis, on which the medical expert for the plaintiff rested his opinion."-"
Subsequent developments, if any, in this Kleinman case are un-
available at present writing. However it does illustrate (a) the import-
ance of adequate medical preparation and presentation, upon which
the case at bar would probably turn, (b) the variation in thinking among
the judges, and (c) the likelihood that a close and borderline case would
have to be vigorously fought, probably through several trials and ap-
peals.
In lieu of discussing any more cases in detail wherein recovery was
allowed in overexertion cases (which would be merely cumulative, for
the decisions on this point are veritably legion, a representative number,
particularly from other jurisdictions, pro and con, will be here briefly
referred to. Recovery has been allowed in these instances as being
caused by "external, violent and accidental means"--:
(1) for a heart attack incurred when attempting to right an automobile after it
had skidded into a ditch; 23
(2) where fright and exertion induced by an impending automobile crash caused a
cerebral hemorrhage;24
(3) for a coronary thrombosis suffered when tripping over a garden hose while
carrying a heavy load;25
(4) when a brain abscess developed after lifting a sack of cement; 20
(5) as the result of a rupture of the heart vessels suffered in lifting some cotton
bales at noon (death occurring at 5 P.M. the same day);27
(6) for a hernia occurring while trying to start a pump engine;2 8
(7) when the lunging of a horse caused a coronary thrombosis; 29
(8) after a fall resulted in a coronary thrombosis;30
(9) for a rupture of the pancreas while pitching hay; 31
22. 276 App. Div. 142, 144, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 511, 512 (1st Dep't 1949).
23. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Heatfield, 141 F. 2d 648 (9th Cir. 1944).
24. Pierce v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 Wash. 2d 151, 109 P. 2d 322 (1941).
25. Breese v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 247 App. Div. 850, 286 N. Y. Supp. 488 (3d Dep't
1936).
26. Paoli v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 289 Ill. App. 87, 6 N. E. 2d 909 (1937).
27. Pledger v. Business Men's Accident Ass'n, 228 S. W. 110 (Tex. 1921).
28. Bankers Life Co. v. Nelson, 56 Wyo. 260, 108 P. 2d 584 (1940).
29. Clay County Cotton Co. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 113 F. 2d 856 (8th Cir. 1940).
30. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Francis, 148 F. 2d 590 (8th Cir. 1945);
this case contains excellent data regarding medical terms and medical testimony, particu-
larly in question and answer form.
31. Shurtz v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 150 Kan. 169, 92 P. 2d 70 (1939).
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(10) where inhalation of smoke and overexertion caused a coronary occlusion; " -
(11) for a rupture of sacroiliac muscles suffered in supporting a heavy vweight; 33
(12) where the gall bladder was ruptured when lifting a heavy stove;a4
(13) for angina pectoris resulting from a fall; 35
(14) as the result of a rupture of the lumbo-sacral intervertebral disc incurred
when lifting a patient out of bed;3 0
(15) when a stomach ulcer was ruptured in lifting a sack of flour; 37
(16) upon drowning; 38
(17) as the result of overexposure and freezing;39
(18) from an overdose of sleeping pills; 40
(19) as the result of carbon monoxide poisoning; 4 '
(20) in the case of ptomaine poisoning or acute indigestion; 42
(21) where a dentist utilized an x-ray machine in treating patients but developed
ulcers on his fingers; 4
3
(22) heat prostration induced by lifting heavy bags of coffee on a hot day; 44
(23) where vomitus lodged in the throat, causing asphyxiation; 45
32. Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n v. Blunk, 207 Ind. App. 279, 20 N. E. 2d 660 (1939).
33. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mathews, 57 Ga. App. 446, 195 S. E. 887 (1937).
34. Nelson v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 103 F. 2d 363 (7th Cir. 1939).
35. Root v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 92 App. Div. 578, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1055
(4th Dep't 1904), aff'd, 180 N. Y. 527, 72 N. E. 1150 (1905).
36. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Brockman, 123 F. 2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1942), cerl.
denied, 315 U. S. 816 (1942).
37. Sentinel Life Ins. Co. v. Blacner, 77 F. 2d 347 (10th Cir. 1935), cerl. denied,
296 U. S. 602 (1935).
38. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hess, 161 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947).
39. Wills v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., 108 Mont. 536, 91 P. 2d 695 (1939).
40. Meyer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 249 App. Div. 243, 291 N. Y. Supp. 912 (2d
Dep't 1936), appeal dismissed, 276 N. Y. 557, 12 N. E. 2d 573 (1937). Incidentally, after
reviewing the authorities on accidents, the Appellate Division made this pertinent observa-
tion concerning "external force":
"So we may say that in this State the definitions of 'accident' and 'accidental' are not
strictly limited to the sudden application of some external and violent force, but include
something that happens which causes injury or death, where the original act was a volun-
tary one leading not to the natural and probable consequences, but to an unforeseen
result. This in the common speech of men is deemed an accident, and the cause accidental.
"Likewise, the words 'external' and 'violent' are not so limited in legal effect that the
insurer may escape liability by strict definition of the terms. It is not always necessary
that these words shall be interpreted as related to a blow or fall; but they are given a
wider sweep as elements of causation where bodily injuries follow. (Paul v. Travelers' Ins.
Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 478, 479). In the ordinary understanding of men, the unexpected result
in this case of taking a sedative would be an accident caused by some violent reaction
of the drug taken, exercising a force external to its natural effects; and with death result-
ing from an accidental cause." Id. at 246, 291 N. Y. Supp. at 917.
41. Brady v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 331 Ill. App. 114, 72 N. E. 2d 629 (1947).
42. Newsoms v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 147 Va. 471, 137 S. E. 456 (1927).
43. King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 1, 192 At. 311 (1937).
44. Layton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 89 S. W. 2d 576 (Mo. App. 1936).
45. Ash v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 170 Misc. 227, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1938), afl'd,
283 N. Y. 718, 28 N. E. 2d 723 (1940).
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(24) pulmonary embolism induced by violent choking, coughing and snoring after
an operation even though the embolus was derived from a thrombosis incurred
in a previous operation; 46
(25) when the act of jumping back suddenly so as to avoid being hit by an auto-
mobile resulted in the coil of the small bowel being damaged; 47
(26) from fright and strain when driving a runaway horse.48
But recovery has been denied under these circumstances:
(1) for a coronary thrombosis suffered when pushing a stalled automobile;40
(2) where a railway mail clerk ruptured himself when lifting heavy sacks of mail
in the course of his customary occupation;50
(3) for appendicitis caused by muscles rubbing against a person's appendix while
bicycling;r5
(4) where a grocery clerk ruptured a peptic ulcer in lifting a case of corn; 52
(5) for overexertion, resulting in a heart attack, caused by driving a car through
heavy mud and carrying fence rails;
53
(6) when a sawmill fireman worked unusually hard and suffered a coronary oc-
clusion. 54
Additional illustrations, pro and con, could be tabulated, running
the gamut of human experience, ad infinitem and ad nauseam. There
are as many decisions denying recovery as allowing recovery for over-
exertion as constituting "external, violent and accidental means." It
should suffice for our purposes simply to set forth in a note 5 references
where pertinent cases are collated and discussed.
Contusion or Wound
The writer's most serious doubt on the question of the likelihood of
an eventually successful suit for double indemnity arises from the
rigorous provision of the insurance policy requiring proof that the bodily
injuries causing the death were- "evidenced by a contusion or wound
on the exterior of the body (except in case of accidental drowning or
an internal injury revealed by an autopsy)."
46. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 178 F. 2d 534 (9th Cir. 1949).
47. Cory v. National Casualty Co., 120 S. W. 2d 833 (Tex. 1938).
48. McGlinchy v. Fidelity & Casaulty Co., 80 Me. 251, 14 Atl. 13 (1888); also dis-
cussed on "external wound" point at p. 302 infra.
49. Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Wash. 2d 594, 174 P. 2d 961 (1946).
50. Fane v. National Ass'n Ry. Postal Clerks, 197 App. Div. 145, 188 N. Y. Supp. 222
(4th Dep't 1921).
51. Appel v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 86 App. Div. 83, 83 N. Y. Supp. 238 (4th Dep't 1903),
aff'd, 180 N. Y. 514, 72 N. E. 1139 (1904).
52. Southern States Life Ins. Co. v. Wilshire, 203 S. W. 2d 588 (Tex. 1947).
53. Pope v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 103 F. 2d 265 (8th Cir. 1939).
54. Crowell v. Sunset Casualty Co., 21 Wash. 2d 238, 150 P. 2d 728 (1944).
55. 7 A. L. R. 1129 (1918); 14 A. L. R. 784 (1920); 35 A. L. R. 1177 (1924); 90
A. L. R. 1382 (1934); 166 A. L. R. 462 (1946); 5 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA INSURANCE LAW
§§ 1136, 1137 et seq., 1145 et seq. (1929); 29 A.uERICAN JURISPRUDENCE §§ 930 et seq., 1006.
[Vol. 19
1950] RECOVERY OF DOUBLE INDEMNITY BENEFITS 299
It is important to bear in mind that the preceding provision of the
policy is in the alternative to the effect that proof is required of an ex-
ternal wound unless an internal injury is revealed by an autopsy. The
writer will assume that no external wound or contusion in the commonly
accepted meaning of that term appeared on Smythe's body. Again we
have a conflict of authority as to what constitutes such a wound or con-
tusion but the probability this time is that such policy provision will
present insurmountable difficulties, thereby barring ultimate recovery;
no doubt medical testimony on this subject will be the decisive factor.
However, as the writer views the situation, there are some possible
methods of approach available that may present the way by which this
difficulty of proof may nevertheless be overcome:
(1) medical testimony, if available, that a heart attack does reveal itself on the
exterior of the body;
(2) proof that the decedent, at the time of the occurrence of the heart at-
tack, appeared "pale," "weak," "emaciated," or "nauseous," or broke into a
"sweat," or his skin was "discolored," or his lips and tongue were "swollen," or
he "frothed" at the mouth, or there was some manifestation of inability to con-
trol a bodily function, such as the bowels;
(3) medical testimony that the heart attack would have shown up in the autopsy if
one had been held;
(4) the dead body itself constitutes sufficient proof of a visible sign of injury;
(5) the fact that the beneficiary has been prevented, without fault on his part, from
furnishing proof by autopsy because the decedent was cremated, should not bar
recovery on that account;
(6) the general inclination of the courts to permit recoveries under life insurance
policies whenever at all possible.
The relevancy and the importance of the preceding outline of possible
arguments in favor of recovery, despite the rigorous policy provision
for evidence of an external wound, should become apparent from the fol-
lowing discussion. Illustrative of the inherent difficulties in this problem
is the recent case of Pistolesi v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
CoY6 The facts of this case are most interesting. It appears that the de-
cedent was yachting and for a stunt was traveling hand over hand on a
wire suspended between two masts. He missed the wire with one hand and
was suspended with the other hand for a short period of time; whereupon
he went back to the mast from which he had started. From that time
on, until his death of coronary thrombosis three weeks later, decedent
complained of a pain in his chest, perspired freely upon physical exercise,
his face became pale and lips blue; his breathing was labored and his
countenance drawn. Both the lower and the appellate courts took the
56. Pistolesi v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 427 (N. D. Cal. 1945),
rev'd, 160 F. 2d 668 (9th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 759 (1947).
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position that it was a case of accidental death. Unfortunately, on the
problem of a "visible contusion or wound cn the exterior of the body,"
the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had been unable to comply
with the provision of the policy requiring proof of a visible wound.
The lower court's opinion in this Pistolesi case represents a very
liberal construction of the clause at issue for which attitude there is a
respectable number of authoritative decisions upholding the lower
court's point of view and upon which the District Court relied." After
reviewing the authorities and holding that changes in bodily appearance
constitutes sufficient evidence of a wound or contusion,"' District Judge
Clark considered that equity and justice was on the side of the plaintiff
and made a plea for resolving every possible doubt in favor of the as-
sured. However the Circuit Court of Appeals was of a contrary opinion
because it reversed the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and dismissed
the complaint because in its opinion there was "no evidence of any
wound and ... none of a 'contusion,'" declaring:
"We assume as correct the appellee's contention that the happenings to Pistolesi
on the yacht's rigging accidentally caused coronary thrombosis and, as a result, his
death. We do not agree with appellee's contention that either mere sweating or
paleness of skin or recurring blueing of the lips of Pistolesi after such exertion con-
stitutes a 'visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body.' "59
The Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon the following definitions of
"contusions" and "bruises":
"Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., defines a 'contusion' as 'a bruise;
and injury attended With more or less disorganization of the subcutaneous tissue
and effusion of blood beneath the skin but without breaking the skin.' Funk &
Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary as
"'1. The act of bruising by striking or pounding, or the state of being so bruised;
also a pulverizing by beating or pounding.
"'2. Surg. A bruise; an injury, as from a blow with a blunt instrument, that
does not make an open wound.''"°
57. As a matter of interest, no autopsy was possible inasmuch as the decedent's body
had been cremated in accordance with the request of the assured; however no mention
is made in these Pistolesi opinions as to the legal consequences of the failure to have an
autopsy made on this account.
58. An excellent review of the authorities upholding the view that any change, how-
ever slight, in the body appearance will be sufficient to comply with the requirement as tn
a "visible wound or contusion," is contained in Notes, 39 A. L. R. 1011 (1942) and
117 A. L. R. 760 (1938); see also 6 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA INSURANCE LAW § 1265 (1930);
29 AmERIcAN JURISPRUDENCE § 940.
59. Pistolesi v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F. 2d 668, 669 (9th Cir. 1947).
60. Ibid. But see the more liberal definition approved by the Illinois court In People
v. Durand, 307 II. 611, 139 N. E. 78 (1923): "In medicine the word 'wounds' means in-
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This Pistolesi decision also serves to illustrate the importance of
medical testimony in the individual case for apparently the uncontra-
dicted medical testimony corresponded with the definitions of "con-
tusions" and "bruises" referred to by the Circuit Court."
On the other hand it had early been held in Gale v. Mutual Aid and
Accident Ass'n., 2 that the requirements for "external and visible signs"
of injury are not to be technically or literally construed. There the
claimant was seeking to recover payments for disability arising out
of lifting a heavy iron pot and the point at issue was whether or not
there was on his body any "external and visible mark or sign of the
injury." Apparently there was no such visible wound in the ordinarily
accepted meaning of the term although plaintiff claimed to have strained
his diaphragm and recti muscles. However, from statements made by
their patient and their manual examination, several doctors were of the
opinion that he was suffering from strained muscles. On the basis of
such medical testimony the General Term was of the qpinion that it is
not always necessary that the injury be visible to the eye as long as there
is some objective evidence of an injury, which would assure the insurance
company of protection against fraudulent claims, holding that while
the evidence of the injury must be external, it need not be visible to
the eye but may be ascertained by the sense of touch and feeling.
This case was one of the authorities relied upon by the Appellate Di-
vision in a very interesting subsequent decision, Root v. London Guar-
antee & Accident Co."5 Its facts are worthy of considerable examination
juries of every description that affect either the hard or soft parts of the body, and it
comprehends bruises, contusions, fractures, luxations, etc. In law the word means any
lesion of the body, and the correct definition of a lesion is a hurt, loss, or injury." Id.
at 624, 139 N. E. at 83.
61. Pitsolesi v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F. 2d 66S (9th Cir. 1947):
"Q. State whether blue lips are wounds or contusions? A. Blue lips are not a wound
or contusion, not a bruise.
"Ar. Healy: I move to strike the answer as not responsive, it can be answered yes
or no. A. The answer is no.
"A. Blueness of the skin is a result of the oxygen content of the blood-vcinous blood
is blue and the oxygenized blood is red. When the heart action is insufficient and the blood
is not pumped properly and sufficient oxygen does not enter the blood, that imparts a blue
color or character to the skin, the blood becomes blue, and that imparts the color to the
skin. There is no damage and there is no wound or contusion.
"Q. Is there any damage to the subcutaneous tissue? A. There is not.
"Q. In the case of pallor is there any damage to the subcutaneous tissue? A. There is
not.
"Q. In case of pallor is there any effusion of blood beneath the Aain? A. No.
'IQ. In case of blue lips is there any effusion of blood beneath the skin? A. No." Id. at 670.
62. 66 Hun 600, 21 N. Y. Supp. 893 (Gen. Term 1893).
63. 92 App. Div. 578, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1055 (4th Dep't 1904), a_'d, 180 N. Y. 527, 72
N. E. 1150 (1905). See note 37 supra.
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particularly as the opinion represents as good a favorable authority on
the problem of a visible wound as has been found. The accident policy
involved provided that it did "not cover injuries of which there is no
visible mark on the body (the body itself in a case of death not being
deemed such mark)."")4 The decedent fell from a bicycle and fractured
his hip. However his death was not ascribed to such injury but to angina
pectoris suffered in such fall. Immediately after the accident decedent's
"face was pallid, he became emaciated and complained constantly of
internal pain in his back . . . and in his chest." The anginal pains in-
creased in intensity until death occurred soon after the accident. The
Appellate Division overruled defendant's contention that recovery should
be denied because of a failure to prove a visible wound. It based its de-
cision upon two grounds (a) where death clearly results from an acci-
dent, "the policy should be construed to hold the defendant liable even
though no contusions or marks appear upon the body" and, (b) in any
event pallor, enaciation and weakness constitute sufficient visible sign
of injuries. In this connection the court declared:
"The physicians testified that the heart spasms were not attributable to a broken
femur. There was no visible mark on the back or chest and the appellant contends
that the anginal pains even though resulting from the accident do not bring the
case within the compass of the policy. We think this is too narrow a construction
to put upon its language. Where it is plain that an accident has occurred and severe
injuries have resulted and it is a fair deduction from the circumstances that death
ensued as the direct consequence of such accident the policy should be construed to
hold the defendant liable even though no contusions or marks appear upon the body.
A man may be killed by a blow over the heart, or by drowning or by falling from
a balloon and death ensue before reaching the ground and in each instance there
may be no mark upon the body, yet the death is by accidental means and should
be within the purview of the policy.
". .. The defendant evidently intended that this clause should exclude liability
in case of death from accident unless there is a visible mark upon the body. It
is very doubtful whether the scope of the language will be so extended in any event.
(Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472; McGlinchey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
80 Me. 251.)" 65
McGlinchey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,00 a Maine decision relied
upon by the New York court, represents an early example of how a
court bent over backwards in order to support a verdict in favor of an
64. This parenthetical clause represents an attempt by insurance companies to circum-
vent the holdings of some courts to the effect that a policy provision requiring a "visible
wound or contusion" would not be applied in case of death because death itself constitutes
sufficient proof of the injury. See notes 59 and 50 supra.
65. Root v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 92 App. Div. 578, 581, 582, 86 N. Y.
Supp. 1055, 1057, 1058 (4th Dep't 1904), aff'd, 180 N. Y. 527, 72 N. E. 1150 (1905).
66. 80 Me. 251, 14 AtI. 13 (1893).
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insurance beneficiary. Decedent's horse became frightened, running
away for a considerable distance, but there was no collision, upset or
blow. As a result of the ensuing fright and exertion in attempting to
control the runaway horse, the decedent suffered intense sickness and
pain immediately after the accident, dying within the hour of a ruptured
heart vessel. After the Maine court had decided that death had been
caused by "external, violent, and accidental means," it went on to hold
that a requirement for an "external and visible sign upon the body"
does not apply to fatal injuries but only to non-fatal injuries, the dead
body itself constituting sufficient proof, stating:
"It would be utterly unjust if this condition applied in cases of death. It would
preclude recovery in all instances where death occurs by drowning, freezing, poison-
ing, suffocation, concussion,--means of death leaving no outward mark,-and also
where the insured has been killed, and his body is missing. The context shows that
the clause is only applicable to injuries not resulting in death... He has unusual
chance for feigning an internal injury if disposed to defraud the insurers, but no
such protection is required where the accident causes death. The dead body is
external and visible sign enough that an injury was received.2 T
The following charge of a trial judge, approved by the Supreme Court
of the United States"3 and frequently cited, indicates the length to which
courts will go in an endeavor to find sufficient compliance with the
requirement for a visible sign of injury:
"Complaint of internal soreness is not such a sign, for that you cannot see, but
if the internal injury produces, for example, a pale and Sickly look in the face, if it
causes vomiting or retching, or bloody or unnatural discharges from the bowels,
if, in short, it sends forth to the observation of the eye, in the struggle of nature,
any signs of the injury, then those are external and visible signs, provided they
are the direct results of the injury. . ... ,0
As indicated by the discussion of the preceding cases, it is apparent
that some courts will decide that (a) most anything will constitute a
visible wound, even an internal injury, or (b) there is no necessity for
such proof where there is no doubt that the assured suffered an injury
as the result of an accident, and under such circumstances there is no
danger of the insurance company being mulcted by fraudulent claims,
which was the reason for the insertion of such a clause in the policy
in the first place.
Hunter v. Federal Casualty Co. is an excellent authority for those
67. Id. at 254, 14 Atl. at 16.
68. United States Mut. Accident Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100 (1889). Here the de-
cedent had jumped to the ground from a five foot platform and suffered an internal in-
jury, a stricture of the duodenum.
69. Id. at 111.
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legal principles.7" There plaintiff had wrenched his back while engaged
in lifting with all his strength, paralysis developed, and he sued for
disability payments. After deciding that plaintiff had been disabled as
the result of an accident under the policy, the Appellate Division had
to construe the clause of the policy providing that disability payments
would be reduced 80% if there were "no visible mark on the body." On
this point the trial judge left it to the jury to determine whether, within
the meaning of the policy, there were any visible marks on the plaintiff's
body, charging that there need not be a scar or abrasion on the surface
of the body provided there be some manifestation of injury. The Ap-
pellate Division affirmed, saying:
". .. It has been held that where a person had received an internal injury and
there was no visible injury to the surface of the body by way of a bruise or cut,
or anything of that kind, the fact that the person injured was pale, that perspjiration
stood out on his face, that he had the appearance of suffering and that he passed
blood were all visible marks within the meaning of such a clause, the construction
of the court being that the policy insured against an accidental internal injury, lke
a broken bone, or a rupture, and that it was not limited to an injury received exter-
nally but that any visible sign indicating internal injury would satisfy the condition
of the policy. It seems to me that that is a reasonable construction and should be
followed in this case. (Root v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 92 App. Div.
578; aff'd, 180 N. Y. 527.)" 1
A most interesting case along this line is Wiecking v. Phoenix Mutual
Life Insurance C0.72 In this case an action was brought to recover
double indemnity benefits under an accident policy requiring that the
injury be evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of
the body, except in case of drowning or of internal injury revealed by
an autopsy. The assured suffered a sunstroke while playing golf. He
collapsed on the golf course, dying on that same day of a coronary
occlusion. No autopsy was performed and the body was embalmed
under a pressure system. At first plaintiff demanded only the principal
amount of liability, not asserting a claim for double indemnity inasmuch
as the rule in the federal courts under the Landress v. Phoenix Insurance
Co. decision73 was to the effect that death by sunstroke while playing
golf did not constitute accidental means. However the Supreme Court of
the United States then enunciated its doctrine that the federal courts
should follow the rulings of the local state courts in cases involving
diversity of citizenship.74 Whereupon plaintiff instituted this action.
70. 199 App. Div. 223, 191 N. Y. Supp. 474 (4th Dep't 1921).
71. Id. at 228, 191 N. Y. Supp. at 477.
72. 116 F. 2d 90 (7th Cir. 1940).
73. 291 U. S. 491 (1934).
74. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1937).
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The Circuit Court of Appeals, following the Indiana decisions, held
that death by sunstroke constituted accidental death by injury under
such insurance policy and overruling the insurance company's claim
that the trial court erred in its definition of a visible contusion or wound
on the exterior of the body as required by the policy, affirmed the de-
cision in favor of plaintiff. However the report does not set forth the
trial court's definition of a visible contusion or wound.
Unfortunately the New York decisions on the point of a visible con-
tusion or wound, at least as regards sunburn and sunstroke, cast a great
deal of doubt upon the ability of a plaintiff to comply with such policy
requirement. This view is sustained by the fairly recent case of Diepee
v. Travelers Insurance Co. 75 There the double indemnity provision
provided that for such recovery, except in the case of drowning or internal
injuries revealed by an autopsy, there must be "visible contusion or
wound on the exterior of the body." It appeared that assured's face
and head had been reddened by the sun, with the face somewhat swollen.
Plaintiff's doctor, who had treated the insured, testified that sunstroke
or sunburn is a first degree burn and that inasmuch as a burn is con-
sidered to be a wound and sunburn a burn, it must be considered to be
a wound. However, on cross-examination, plaintiff's doctor admitted
that he had not seen any cut or wound. Despite the fact that another
physican, testifying as an expert, stated that in his opinion sunburn is
considered a first degree burn and that a first degree burn is medically
considered to be a wound, the Appellate Division reversed the verdict
in favor of plaintiff and dismissed the complaint on the ground that,
giving the policy the meaning the average policy holder would attach
to it, there was insufficient evidence of a visible contusion or wound on
the exterior of the body. The opinion relied on Paist v. Aetna Life In-
surance Co., 76 where it was held that a flushed, sunburned face is not a
wound or contusion.77
75. 253 App. Div. 278, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 62 (2d Dep't 1938), aFd, 278 N. Y. 659, 16
N. E. 2d 391 (1938).
76. 60 F. 2d 476 (3d Cir. 1932).
77. 253 App. Div. 278, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 62 (2d Dep't 1938). In following the Paist
ruling, the Appellate Division stated:
"The most reasonable and unstrained construction of the policy in suit, therefore
would seem to be that it does not contemplate that a very red face and head, with the
face somewhat swollen, is evidence of a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the
body. I think this conclusion must be accepted notwithstanding that the courts are dis-
posed to construe policies of insurance liberally and most favorably to beneficiaries, and
that there are decisions that have permitted recoveries in cases where no mark visible to
the eye was left on the body. These cases, however, do not involve sunstroke nor was
there a specification in the contracts that there be 'a visible contusion or wound on the
exterior of the body'; [the Appellate Division would seem to be in error as to the validity
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Since the Court. of Appeals affirmed the Dupee decision, although
without opinion,78 it seems exceedingly doubtful (at least on the basis
of the New York sunburn decisions) that proof of an external wound
on Smythe's body adequate to satisfy the New York courts can be forth-
coming. The well-nigh baffling difficulties and perplexities inherent
in the assumed Smythe case are well illustrated by Rosenthal v. American
Bonding Co.79 This decision is most interesting even though it actually
concerned the construction of a burglary policy which made it a condition
precedent to recovery that there be "visible marks upon the premises
of the actual force and violence used in making entry into the said
premises or exit therefrom." The burglars simply turned the knob of an
unlocked door and walked in, leaving no visible marks within the ordin-
ary, common meaning of the words of that policy. The assured apparently
conceded that there were no visible marks of entry but urged that such
a requirement was simply an evidentiary fact inserted merely for the
purpose of protecting the insurance company against fraudulent claims
and that since there existed ample other proof of the fact of burglary, a
strict construction of that clause denying recovery on such ground should
be rejected. Nevertheless the Court of Appeals refused to follow such a
liberal construction and upheld the right of the insurance company to
require strict proof of evidentiary facts as an indispensable basis for
recovery within the literal language of the clause. Several decisions
taking a more liberal view as to the construction of insurance policies
were specifically called to the attention of the Court of Appeals, but
supposedly distinguished by it, including Root v. London Guarantee
& Accident Co.,supra.80 What makes the Court of Appeals' approving
comment thereon all the more baffling, is the fact that the remarks of
such Court seem directly contrary to the subsequent sunburn cases
of this observation] and the nature and extent of the holdings have been explained In
Rosenthal v. American Bonding Co. (207 N. Y. 162). "In the policy in suit there are
two causes of accidental death for which the insurer agreed to pay without proof of a
visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body, namely, drowning and Internal In-
juries revealed by autopsy. It is not claimed that there is in the case evidence of either
of these causes of death; nor is there in the case any evidence of a visible contusion or
wound on the exterior of the body." Id. at 281, 2 N. Y. S. 2d at 65.
78. The Appellate Division in the Dupee opinion also relied upon an earlier report of
a sunstroke case where, despite the fact that the deceased was "pale, cold and clammy and
bathed in profuse perspiration," it was held that there was insufficient proof of visible
marks of wound upon the decedent's body. Bender v. Ridgely, 235 App. Div, 896, 257 N. Y.
Supp. 1004 (4th Dep't 1932), aff'd, 262 N. Y. 685, 188 N. E. 120 (1933).
79. 207 N. Y. 162, 100 N. E. 716 (1912).
80. 92 App. Div. 578, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1055 (4th Dep't 1904), aff'd, 180 N. Y. 527, 72
N. E. 1150 (1905).
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denying recovery for failure to prove a visible wound. judge Hiscock
made this pertinent observation anent the Root case:
"Root v. London Guarantee & Accident Co. (92 App. Div. 578) was an action to
recover a death loss under an accident insurance policy excluding injuries 'of which
there was no physical mark on the body. The insured received injuries which pro-
duced no immediate outward signs upon the surface of his person, but subsequently
he developed a pallor, emaciation and physical decay, and it was held, as it seems
to me very reasonably, that these visible, external signs of the accident satisfied
the requirement of the policy." 8'2
It is no wonder that the law of accident insurance is bogged down
in a "Serbonian Bog"!
Nor, on the favorable side, should it be overlooked that there are any
number of cases wherein recovery for accidental death has been allowed
without any mention, either in the enumeration of the facts or in the
court's opinion, of the visible wound requirement (although it seems
highly improbable that such a standard provision had not actually been
incorporated in the insurance policy). Moreover some decisions up-
hold a verdict for the beneficiary, despite the fact that such external
wound clause definitely was a part of the policy, although the opinion
will make no direct reference to that point.8s2 Such results, at least
inferentially, should constitute authority contrary to an insurer's con-
tention that recovery is barred by virtue of the effect of such clause.
The Autopsy Problem
Assuming that sufficient proof of a visible wound cannot be produced,
does that mean that recovery will necessarily be barred? Not entirely,
for an argument can be made along the line that (a) an autopsy would
have proved that death was caused by a heart attack induced by over-
exertion, i.e., an accident, and (b) the decedent was cremated before
it was realized that the insurance policy contained an autopsy clause
and the beneficiary should not be penalized because of such cremation.
The validity of this contention (b) does find considerable support in
the reports. The Wiecking decision, a sunburn case, previously dis-
cussed, 3 involved the same clause as the assumed Smythe policy (i.e.,
"except... internal injury revealed by autopsy") and gave the insurance
81. Rosenthal v. American Bonding Co., 207 N. Y. 162, 169, 100 N. E. 716, 718 (1912).
82. Paoli v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 289 Ill. App. 87, 6 N. E. 2d 909 (1937). There
the policy required proof "upon the body [of] external marks of contusion or wound visi-
ble to the eye. ' A jury verdict for the beneficiary was upheld on appeal without any
direct reference being made in the opinion as to the effect of such clause where the as-
sured suffered a brain abscess after lifting a sack of cement.
83. 116 F. 2d 90 (7th Cir. 1940).
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company the right to conduct an autopsy where not forbidden by law.
Nevertheless plaintiff was entitled to recover double indemnity benefits
even though a two year delay in asserting such claim apparently pre-
vented the insurance company from making an autopsy. In several
other cases, where cremation of the assured's body took place while
the beneficiary was unaware of the autopsy clause in the insurance policy,
the fact that the cremation ipso facto rendered an autopsy impossible has
been held not to constitute a bar for recovery of double indemnity bene-
fits. Apparently the rationale of such decisions is that the autopsy stipu-
lation is neither a condition nor a provision for forfeiture of the in-
surance.
84
Other Problems
It is believed that the principles of law herein discussed are those
upon which a court would ultimately base its decision on the facts of
our assumed Smythe case. The writer recognizes only too well that there
may exist a number of collateral problems, such as (a) conflict of laws,8"
(b) pre-existing disease, (c) the adequacy and timeliness of proofs of
death, and (d) due compliance with the other conditions and require-
ments of the insurance policy. However limitations of space prevent
making more than just a passing reference to such collateral questions,
particularly since our main purpose has been to evaluate in the first
instance the possibility of recovering double indemnity benefits in the
general light of the cases on the subject.
Conclusions
(1) It could be readily established that Smythe died of "bodily in-
jury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means."
(2) The policy provision requiring evidence of "a contusion or
wound on the exterior of the body" would probably prevent a recovery
of double indemnity death benefits.
(3) Nevertheless a borderline and difficult case of this nature
could often be won by proper and adequate factual presentation backed
up by a persistent will to win no matter what the cost in time ahd effort.
84. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hess, 161 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Welch, 82 F. 2d 799 (5th Cir. 1936) ; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v Schachner,
70 F. 2d 28 (7th Cir. 1934).
85. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 167 F. 2d 651 (10th Cir. 1948), cert dentid,
335 U. S. 819 (1948); 1 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA or INSURANCE LAW §§ 193-209 (1929); 2
BEALE, CONFLICT or LAWS § 346.4 (1935).
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